An analysis of the battle of cannae and the defeat of the roman army

There is also the residual uncertainty about Hellenistic dating.

An analysis of the battle of cannae and the defeat of the roman army

The model strategic operation earned a deserved place in war college curricula. One complete German army had been destroyed, along with aboutGerman and Axis troopsseriously depleting Axis strength in the east. Inthe Germans had built the famous Hindenburg Line on the Western Front, shortening their lines and thereby increasing their defensive strength.

Hellenistic Monarchs down to the Roman Empire. The Hellenistic Age suffers from some of the same disabilities as Late Antiquity, i.e. it doesn't measure up to the brilliance of the Golden Age of Greece and of late Republican and early Imperial Rome. The Battle of Cannae, between the Carthaginian General Hannibal and the larger Roman army under the command of Lucius Aemilius Paulus and Gaius Terentius Varro in B.C. serves as one of the most influential tactical battles in history. The Roman defeat was total. The scale of the slaughter at Cannae is difficult to comprehend. If the ancient estimates of casualties are accurate, Cannae saw the second deadliest single day of combat ever visited on a western army, and it is estimated that over one hundred Romans died every minute during the height of the battle.

They planned on repeating this strategy in the USSR and started construction of a massive series of defensive works known as the Panther-Wotan line. They intended to retreat to the line late in and bleed the Soviets against it while their own forces recuperated. In February and MarchGerman Field Marshal Erich von Manstein had completed an offensive during the Third Battle of Kharkov, leaving the front line running roughly from Leningrad in the north to Rostov in the south.

Hitler, now desperate to end the war in the east before Allied military power could threaten German—occupied Europe from the west and south, planned to eliminate the large salient formed around Kursk and destroy the large Soviet forces deployed to defend it.

The Oberkommando der Wehrmacht hoped to regain the initiative on the Eastern Front. The Kursk salient also known as the Kursk bulge was created in the aftermath of the German defeat at the Battle of Stalingrad.

The Germans hoped to shorten their lines by eliminating the salient, with pincers breaking through its northern and southern flanks to achieve yet another great encirclement of Red Army forces.

This and repeated German delays to wait for new weapons, including the Panther tank, gave the Red Army time to construct elaborate, layered defenses and position large reserve forces for a strategic counterattack.

The Soviet plan was to soak up the German assault in a colossal web of defensive positions, and only then launch their armoured counter-attack. It was also an important air battle, in which the balance now shifted in the favor of the Soviets.

He suggested tricking the Red Army into attacking in the south against the desperately re-forming Sixth Army, leading them into the Donets Basin in the eastern Ukraine. He would then turn south from Kharkov on the eastern side of the Donets River towards Rostov and trap the entire southern wing of the Red Army against the Sea of Azov.

It would also result in a much straighter and shorter line, and recapture the strategically useful railway city of Kursk located on the main north-south railway line running from Rostov to Moscow. In March the plans crystallized. Contrary to his recent behavior, Hitler gave the General Staff considerable control over the planning of the operation.

Over the next few weeks, they continued to increase the scope of the forces attached to the front, stripping the entire German line of practically anything remotely useful for deployment in the upcoming operation.

They first set the attack for May 4, but then delayed it until June 12, and finally until July 4 in order to allow more time for new weapons to arrive from Germany, especially the new Panther tanks.

Hitler postponed the offensive several more times. On 5 May the launch date became 12 June. But due to the potential threat of an Allied landing in Italy, and delays in armor deliveries Hitler set the launch date to 20 June, and on 17 June it was pushed back to 3 July.

The German Army had long favored such a Cannae-style method, and the tools of Blitzkrieg made these types of tactics even more effective. Blitzkrieg depended on mass, shock, and speed to surprise an enemy and defeat him through disruption of command and supply rather than by destroying all his forces in a major pitched battle.

However, such breakthroughs were easier to achieve if they hit an unexpected location, as the Germans had achieved attacking through the Ardennes inKiev inand towards Stalingrad and the Caucasus in A number of German commanders questioned the idea, notably Guderian. Soviet plans To the West!

Attacks in front of Orel and Kharkov would flatten out the line, and potentially lead to a breakout near the Pripyat Marshes.

An analysis of the battle of cannae and the defeat of the roman army

However, Soviet commanders had considerable concerns over the German plans. The locations of all previous German attacks had caught the Red Army by surprise, but in this case Kursk seemed the obvious target.

Moscow received warning of the German plans through the Lucy spy ring in Switzerland.The Battle of Cannae occurred on August 2, BCE in southeast Italy between Carthaginian forces led by Hannibal Barca and Roman forces led by Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Gaius Terentius Varro.

Hi Jonathan. I know I have posted these suggestions elsewhere on this website, but if you’re looking to expand into Chinese military history, I recommend doing the Battle of Chengpu ( BC) between the Jin and the Chu.

An analysis of the battle of cannae and the defeat of the roman army

The Later Roman Empire The dynasty of the Severi (ad –)Septimius Severus. After the assassination of Commodus on Dec. 31, ad , Helvius Pertinax, the prefect of the city, became emperor.

In spite of his modest birth, he was well respected by the Senate, but he was without his own army. The army of Carthage, under Hannibal, decisively defeated a larger army of the Roman Republic under the consuls Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Gaius Terentius Varro.

It is regarded both as one of the greatest tactical feats in military history and as one of the worst defeats in Roman history.

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Significance. While this battle is often viewed as a decisive battle that accelerated the decline of the Roman Empire, it would be more accurate to say that the Roman defeat indicated the Empire’s growing inability to assert its authority over its porous borders.

Abstract: Historical chronicles of military conflict normally focus on the decisions and perspectives of new methodologies, pioneered by John Keegan’s Face of Battle, have focused attention on the battle experience of the common pfmlures.comng this methodology to a careful reading of details within the Book of Mormon shows an experience in battle .

Chapter 4: The Battle of Cannae | Dickinson College Commentaries